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ENSURING CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
OVERSEAS: A CIVILIAN EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION ACT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO 
EXPANSION OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
ABSTRACT 
This Note considers the advisability of amending the False Claims Act’s 
qui tam provisions beyond instances of fraud to include criminal allegations 
against government contractors employed overseas. It considers the negative 
effects that result from qui tam actions in the fraud context and discusses 
alternatives for holding contractors accountable for crimes committed over-
seas that could avoid those negative effects. This Note particularly focuses 
on and recommends a civilian corollary to the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act—the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. It discusses 
the benefits that the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act would provide 
such as increased judicial efficiency, increased prosecutorial flexibility, and 
even protection of the contractors implicated as compared to the relatively 
uncertain option of local nations’ laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States federal government quite literally employs more 
contractors for services than it can count.1 The government’s limited abil-
ity to even count its service contractors can result in a lack of domestic 
accountability for their contract performance. This lack of accountability 
for service contractors is compounded when contractors commit criminal 
acts2 because of the lack of jurisdiction by American courts to punish the 
wrongdoers3 and a reluctance to submit American citizens to local justice. 
This accountability gap may remain in the public consciousness with the 
necessary political attention only so long as the country remains actively 
engaged overseas and employs service contractors. As America draws 
down its military engagements and troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and shifts its military response tactics toward more remote, hands-off 
methods,4 public awareness of the lack of accountability and political will 
to patch the accountability gap legislatively will also dwindle. Better than 
risk waiting for a scandal to revive public concern, the accountability gap 
must be solved while the issue is in the public consciousness. A legislative 
fix may not only help prevent future political scandals, but would also 
allow contracting companies to operate more effectively both internally 
and overseas by clearly defining their potential for liability before contract 
performance begins.5  
                                                                                                                         
1 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-1007, CIVILIAN SERVICE CONTRACT 
INVENTORIES: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE AGENCY REPORTING AND REVIEW 
EFFORTS 3–4 (2012). The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 required that forty-
nine federal agencies collect and report annually, among other data, the number of 
contractor personnel they employ. Id. Other items were correctly reported, but due to 
conflicting guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, the tally of contractor 
personnel was not provided. Id. at 7–8. The tally will continue to be withheld pending a 
proposed rule change in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Id. 
2 See infra notes 24–44 and accompanying text (discussing recent examples of 
contractors’ overseas crimes from U.S. operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, 
including rape, sex trafficking, and torture). 
3 See Michael J. Davidson & Robert E. Korroch, Extending Military Jurisdiction to 
American Contractors Overseas, 35 PROCUREMENT LAW. 1, 1 (Summer 2000). 
4 These “hands-off” methods are illustrated by America’s response tactics in Libya 
and Syria. See Paul Harris, Robert Gates: No US ‘Boots on Ground’ in Libya, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 31, 2011, 3:12 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/31/gates-rules-o 
ut-american-troops-libya; Jessica Taylor, Pentagon Spokesman: No Boots on the Ground 
in Syria, MSNBC (Sept. 4, 2013, 3:03 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/09/04/pentagon-sp 
okesman-no-boots-on-the-ground-in-syria/. Both sources emphasize that plans in Syria 
and Libya did not include putting “boots on the ground.” Harris, supra; Taylor, supra. 
5 See discussion infra Part  II.C.1– II.C.3 regarding the potential downfalls of amending 
the qui tam provisions to include contractor crimes overseas and Part  IV.B.1– IV.B.2 
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One proposed solution—or one element of a system of solutions—to the 
accountability gap is to expand the qui tam provisions of the False Claims 
Act (FCA)6 beyond fraud to include criminal acts or human rights abuses.7 
This Note will argue that although accountability for government contrac-
tors overseas will remain a problem absent some action, legislative or oth-
erwise, expanding the FCA’s qui tam provisions would be inappropriate 
given the provisions’ complexity, broad scope, undesirable economic incen-
tives, and the availability of preferable statutory alternatives. Instead, this 
Note will argue that Congress should build on the successes of the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)8 by passing its corollary, the Civil-
ian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA).9 Even as operations in Iraq10 
and Afghanistan11 wind down, the federal government’s need for service 
contractors overseas in other, non-military related capacities will remain, if 
not grow.12 Despite—and perhaps because of—reduced military forces in 
                                                                                                                         
 
regarding the potential benefits of a civilian corollary to the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act. 
6 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–31 (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
7 LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE 96 (2011). 
8 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 
2488 (2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–67 (2000 & Supp. 2004)). 
9 See Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010, S. 2979, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 
2010). The House version, H.R. 4567, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010), was identical to the 
Senate version; both died in committee. See also Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
of 2011, S. 1145, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). The corresponding House version was 
H.R. 2136, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); again, both died in committee. Perhaps a third 
attempt will be successful. However, there is no version of CEJA under consideration in 
the 113th Congress. 
10 See Jake Tapper, Obama Announces Complete Drawdown of U.S. Troops from Iraq 
by Year’s End, ABC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011, 12:45 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/polit 
ics/2011/10/obama-to-announce-complete-drawdown-of-u-s-troops-from-iraq-by-years-
end/. Note that while the “drawdown” of troops in Iraq happened over a year prior to the 
publication of this Note, approximately 17,000 government contractors remain employed 
to continue work in the country. See Ted Galen Carpenter, The Iraq Debacle Continues, 
NAT’L INT. (Jan. 3, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-iraq-debacle-contin 
ues-7922. 
11 See Mark Landler & Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Is Open to Withdraw Afghan Force 
After 2014, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013, at A8. 
12 See War Profiteering and Other Contractor Crimes Committed Overseas: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 48 (2007) [hereinafter War Profiteering] (statement of Scott 
Horton, Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law) (“The force 
profile has changed dramatically. The current mix draws far more heavily on civilians 
than at any time in our history ....”). 
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Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will continue to employ contrac-
tors to support the work that remains to be done there such as infrastruc-
ture and humanitarian efforts. Senator Leahy, a sponsor of the CEJA, 
predicted that as the drawdowns continue “fewer and fewer of the thou-
sands of Americans who stay on in these countries will be covered by 
current law.”13 Therefore, it remains vital that Congress pass a civilian 
corollary to the MEJA to close the accountability gap for contractors em-
ployed both in current and future engagements. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SERVICE CONTRACTORS, THEIR EMPLOYMENT, AND 
THEIR PERFORMANCE 
A. History of the Use of Service Contractors 
The federal government has increasingly relied on contractors to sup-
port deployed forces since the middle of the twentieth century.14 At one 
point before the 2007 “surge,” there were about 100,000 contractors in 
Iraq, compared with 125,000 uniformed personnel, or just over forty per-
cent of total personnel.15 The World War II and Korean War contractor 
figures are utterly dwarfed by those in Iraq and Afghanistan, “in both of 
those conflicts, the percentage of contract personnel involved would have 
run between 3 percent and 5 percent.”16  
Two factors explain the dramatic increase in the use of contractors 
since the 1991 Persian Gulf War: (1) the change in the nature of American 
military engagements abroad, and (2) decreased political tolerance for 
increasing troop numbers overseas.17 The nature of American engagements 
overseas has changed from the clashes of great powers seen in the two 
                                                                                                                         
13 Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senate Judiciary Committee Reports Leahy-
Authored Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (June 23, 2011), http://www.l 
eahy.senate.gov/press/senate-judiciary-committee-reports-leahy-authored-civilian-extrate 
rritorial-jurisdiction-act. 
14 See War Profiteering, supra note 12, at 48.  
15 Id. See also Scott Horton, Providing Accountability for Private Military 
Contractors: Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on June 19, 2007, 
HARPER’S MAG. (June 19, 2007, 4:00 PM), http://harpers.org/print/?pid=309. 
16 War Profiteering, supra note 12, at 48. 
17 Charles Tiefer, No More Nisour Squares: Legal Control of Private Security 
Contractors in Iraq and After, 88 OR. L. REV. 745, 752–53 (2009). At its peak, the U.S. 
government employed 180,000 contractors in Iraq, of which 30,000 provided security 
services. Id. at 753. In contrast, the U.S. employed an estimated 9,200 contractors during 
the Persian Gulf War. Renae Merle, Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 5, 2006, at D01. 
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World Wars to the rise of counterinsurgency operations and humanitarian 
efforts conducted by the Department of Defense.18 The late 1990s conflict 
in the Balkans marked a shift in the way America finances and staffs these 
engagements.19 Professor Laura A. Dickinson describes the political climate 
during the Clinton administration as one in which the nation was too dis-
turbed to see troops involved in humanitarian conflicts following the disas-
trous loss of American military lives in Somalia.20 Nor was there any popu-
lar enthusiasm for adding to the size of the federal workforce at the time.21 
In fact, both the military and federal civilian workforce were cut drastically 
leading up to the Balkans conflict.22 Not only does the use of contractors 
solve the logistical issue of how to staff engagements without growing the 
federal work force, but to some extent, contracting with private firms for 
necessary services solves both of these problems.23 
B. Contractor Accountability Failures in Recent Conflicts 
1. DynCorp in the Balkans 
During the 1990’s U.S. engagement in the Balkans, the Department of 
State hired military contractor DynCorp to provide training to Bosnian 
police.24 Employees of DynCorp were accused of running a sex trafficking 
operation—buying and selling women and girls as young as twelve, and 
purchasing passports for them so they could be “exported.”25 One employee 
                                                                                                                         
18 See MOSHE SCHWARTZ & JENNIFER CHURCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43074, 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE OF CONTRACTORS TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS: 
BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2–3 (2013). 
19 See DICKINSON, supra note 7, at 33–34. 
20 Id. at 34 (“Determined to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the Clinton administration 
was nevertheless haunted by the specter of U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets 
in Somalia during Clinton’s first venture in committing U.S. forces to humanitarian 
intervention, and so the political pressure on Clinton to minimize U.S. casualties was 
particularly high.”). 
21 Id. at 33–34. Moreover, there was not much ability to do so; at least not in a timely 
manner. Id. (“‘It always was much easier to add contractors’ because funding was much 
more readily available. Moreover ... in filling the position [with a contractor] fewer rules 
applied, so ‘you could hire someone much more quickly.’” (quoting a senior official at 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office)). 
22 See id. at 32, 34–35. 
23 See id. at 33–34. It is estimated that by the end of the conflict, there were about as 
many contractors as military personnel in the Balkans. Id. at 34. 
24 See DICKINSON, supra note 7, at 34. 
25 Kelly Patricia O’Meara, DynCorp Disgrace, INSIGHT MAG., Feb. 4, 2002, at 12 (“[I]t 
was no different than slavery.” (quoting whistleblower Ben Johnston)); David Isenberg, It’s 
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even filmed himself in the act of abusing his victims.26 The employees 
involved suffered few, if any, legal consequences: they were transferred 
back to the United States, the Army and the United Nations conducted 
investigations, and DynCorp fired some of the employees involved.27 
2. Abu Ghraib in Iraq 
The Abu Ghraib prison scandal is one of the most notorious U.S. abuses 
in Iraq; it involved not only American soldiers but also contractors em-
ployed by the Department of the Interior.28 The scandal was a major moti-
vation for amending the language29 in the MEJA.30 The amended language 
extended jurisdiction to contractors and sub-contractors employed by any 
federal agency “to the extent such employment relates to supporting the 
mission of the Department of Defense overseas.”31 
3. Nisour Square in Baghdad, Iraq 
In September 2007 in Baghdad’s Nisour Square, Blackwater32 guards 
who were contracted to provide diplomatic security services were in-
volved in a highly-publicized incident in which seventeen Iraqis died.33 
                                                                                                                         
 
Déjà Vu for DynCorp All Over Again, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2010, 8:47 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/its-dj-vu-for-dyncorp-all_b_792394.html. 
26 Isenberg, Déjà Vu, supra note 25. 
27 See id. 
28 See DICKINSON, supra note 7, at 57. As of 2011, twelve soldiers involved had been 
punished by the military, yet not a single contractor involved had been held accountable. Id. 
See also Scott Shane, Some U.S. Prison Contractors May Avoid Charges, BALT. SUN, May 
24, 2004, at A1 (“The U.S. civilian interrogators questioning prisoners at Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq work … under a … contract … from the Department of the Interior ….”). 
29 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 108-375, § 1088, 118 Stat. 1811, 2066–67 (2004) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 3267(1)(A)(iii)(II)). 
30 Shane, supra note 28 (“[L]egal experts say [that] contractors for nonmilitary 
agencies such as the Department of the Interior may be able to escape prosecution for 
crimes they commit overseas because of an apparent loophole in the [MEJA]. The law, 
passed in 2000, applies only to contractors with the Department of Defense—a flaw some 
members of Congress want to remedy.”). 
31 § 1088, 118 Stat. at 2066. 
32 Blackwater changed its name in 2009 to “Xe Services,” and again in 2011 to 
“Academi.” Former Blackwater Firm Renamed Again, BBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2011, 1:28 
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16149971. 
33 DICKINSON, supra note 7, at 1. 
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One investigation found that fourteen of these deaths were “unjustified.”34 
A subsequent report found that none of the deaths were justified.35 
4. Government Contractors Hiring and Supporting Warlords in 
Afghanistan 
The Senate Armed Services Committee concluded that the behavior of 
certain security contractors in Afghanistan represented a “sharp detour” 
from the U.S. mission.36 The report detailed multiple instances where Af-
ghan nationals employed by the United States as subcontractors for security 
services were connected with the Taliban.37 The American primary contrac-
tors implicated also might have been indirectly funding local “warlords,” as 
well as the Taliban.38 In one of the more egregious instances described in 
the report, a raid was conducted on a Taliban meeting, which later was 
discovered to have been hosted in the home of a local subcontractor.39 
Additionally, some subcontractors hired by the American primary contrac-
tors as guards were alleged to be Iranian intelligence agents.40 
5. “Interrogations” By Central Intelligence Contractor in Afghanistan 
Mr. David Passaro’s “interrogation” of an Afghan national suspected 
of orchestrating attacks on an American military facility is another glaring 
example of contractors’ misdeeds in Afghanistan.41 The interrogation 
spanned two days and resulted in the suspect’s death.42 Mr. Passaro, a 
                                                                                                                         
34 Id. (citing David Johnston & John M. Broeder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis 
Without Cause: Report on Blackwater, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1). 
35 Id. (citing Blackwater Faulted by U.S. Military: Report, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2007, 
5:24 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/05/us-iraq-contractors-report-idUSN0 
439965120071005?sp=true). 
36 See S. REP. NO. 111-345, at ix (2010) (“Conclusion 1: The proliferation of private 
security personnel in Afghanistan is inconsistent with the counterinsurgency strategy.… 
Conclusion 2: Afghan warlords and strongmen operating as force providers to private 
security contractors have acted against U.S. and Afghan government interests.”); Scott 
Horton, Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan Fueling the Taliban, Senate Report 
Concludes, HARPER’S MAG. (Oct. 8, 2010, 1:33 PM), http://harpers.org/blog/2010/10 
/private-security-contractors-in-afghanistan-fueling-the-tal iban-senate-report-concludes/. 
37 Karen DeYoung, US Contract Failures Said to Aid the Enemy, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 
2010, at A1. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 111-345, at iii. 
40 DeYoung, supra note 37. 
41 United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 2009). 
42 Id. at 211–12. 
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contractor employed by the CIA, beat the suspect both with his hands and 
with a foot-long, Maglite-type flashlight, and kicked him forcefully enough 
to lift him off the ground.43 The suspect later died of injuries sustained dur-
ing the interrogation.44 
C. The False Claims Act’s Qui Tam Provisions As an Option For 
Accountability 
In the face of these high-profile criminal allegations, many scholars and 
commentators have made suggestions to fill the accountability gap and 
punish contractors who commit crimes outside of the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States.45 For example, Professor Laura Dickinson has suggest-
ed expanding the qui tam provisions of the FCA beyond their traditional use 
in prosecutions for contractor fraud against the government to include hu-
man rights abuses.46 In suggesting this, Dickinson describes the FCA gener-
ally, referring to relators—the term used to describe those members of the 
public who bring qui tam claims—as potentially recovering money for 
successfully “exposing contractor wrongdoing.”47 Professor Dickinson’s 
suggestion is that, among other changes, the qui tam provisions of the FCA 
ought to be extended to include instances of reporting crimes—other than 
submitting fraudulent claims to the government—committed by contrac-
tors, especially human rights abuses.48 This suggestion is overly simplistic 
considering the complexity of the FCA and its qui tam provisions, the 
undesirable economic incentives they provide, and the availability of pref-
erable statutory alternatives.49  
II. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND ITS QUI TAM PROVISIONS 
Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase, qui tam pro domino rege quam 
pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur—he who pursues this action on behalf of 
                                                                                                                         
43 Id.  
44 See id. at 212. 
45 Professor Dickinson herself suggests many other options to improve accountability 
for contractors. See generally DICKINSON, supra note 7. 
46 Id. at 96. 
47 Id.  
48 See id. 
49 Id. (suggesting that these changes “would go a long way toward making sure that 
any contract-based efforts to provide accountability will have back-end enforcement to 
encourage compliance.”). 
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the King as well as for himself.50 The FCA’s qui tam provisions incentiv-
ize private citizens to bring civil actions on behalf of the government (the 
King) against those suspected of defrauding the government by awarding 
relators—those who report the fraud and bring the suit—a portion of the 
damages recovered, whether or not the government chooses to intervene.51 
The FCA’s legislative roots date back to the Civil War era52 with the 
Informer’s Act of 1863.53 However, the qui tam process was so abused 
after the Civil War that the government’s ability to effectively initiate its 
own fraud investigations suffered.54 Congress amended the qui tam pro-
cess several times as the legislative pendulum swung back and forth be-
tween extremes of how much power individuals had to initiate and control 
the course of the litigation against a fraudulent contractor.55 
During World War II, members of the public exploited a “loophole” in 
the Act that allowed a relator to bring a qui tam action based on infor-
mation the government already had, including information from ongoing 
investigations.56 Congress patched the loophole with the False Claims Act 
of 1943.57 The 1943 FCA58 gave complete control over the process to the 
Department of Justice (DOJ).59 “Thereafter the qui tam provision was 
largely ignored as a dead letter of U.S. law for another 40 years.”60 
During the expansive military buildup under President Reagan’s admin-
istration, government contractors’ fraudulent claims again attracted much 
public attention and ire.61 In 1986, Congress again amended the FCA,62 
restoring some power over the qui tam process to individual relators.63 The 
balance of power over the litigation in qui tam actions is much the same 
                                                                                                                         
50 Robin Page West, Being a Qui Tam Whistleblower: It’s Not for Everybody, BUS. L. 
TODAY, May–June 2008, at 31, 35; see also William Y. Culbertson, Whistleblowers and 
Prosecutors: Achieving the Best Interests of the Public, BUS. L. TODAY, May–June 2008, 
at 30, 32. 
51 See CARL J. PECKINPAUGH, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS FOR SERVICES 335–36 (1997). 
52 See West, supra note 50, at 35. 
53 Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. 
54 PECKINPAUGH, supra note 51, at 335. 
55 See id. 
56 See Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32. 
57 See id. 
58 Act of Dec. 23, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-213, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (current version at 
31 U.S.C. § 3730). 
59 Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153. 
63 See Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32. 
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today.64 The 1986 FCA amendments balanced incentives for individuals to 
initiate proceedings with the government’s interests in controlling and 
initiating its own fraud investigations.65 “The obvious purpose for bringing 
back this abandoned provision in 1986 was to punish fraud and, like the 
old law, it had two basic components: encouraging whistleblowers and 
allowing its prosecution through private lawyers.”66 These amendments, 
restoring some control over the litigation to individual relators, greatly 
increased the number of fraud incidents reported.67 
The 1986 FCA amendments differed in purpose in an important way 
from the 1863 Informer’s Act. By 1986 the government had many more 
prosecutors on staff than in 1863, and thus was theoretically much more 
able to investigate fraud on its own, “which made it necessary for propo-
nents to criticize the DOJ in order to rationalize the private lawyers’ role 
in the modern era.”68 This difference means the Act not only sets a rogue 
to catch a rogue, but also sets a rogue to discover fraud that apathetic, 
unwary, or under-trained government watchdogs miss. 
Lastly, Congress amended some FCA provisions through the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act69 in 2009 in response to judicial interpre-
tations of the FCA.70 These amendments included statutory clarifications 
on the nuances of what constitutes a cognizable claim and procedures for 
filing a claim.71 
A. Basic Mechanics of Qui Tam Actions 
Generally, any member of the public with original knowledge of the 
fraud may bring a suit.72 The individual who brings the action on behalf of 
the government is known as a relator.73 However, the relator’s information 
                                                                                                                         
64 See id. 
65 See PECKINPAUGH, supra note 51, at 335. 
66 Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32. 
67 See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
68 Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32. 
69 Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). 
70 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS 
ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 8 (2009) [hereinafter DOYLE, QUI TAM]. 
71 See id.; see also infra Part II.C.3 (discussing other, more potentially troublesome 
developments in judicial interpretation). 
72 PECKINPAUGH, supra note 51, at 337 (“The relator must be the original source of at 
least some of the information that serves as the basis for the suit.”). The meaning of 
“original source” is a hotly debated topic, even after the 2009 amendments. See 
discussion infra Part  II.C.3. 
73 PECKINPAUGH, supra note 51, at 335–37. 
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may not have been obtained solely through public disclosure and must be 
voluntarily disclosed by the relator to the government.74 This requirement 
often serves to disqualify some government employees due to the nature of 
their public sector employment.75 However, “[t]here is no blanket exclusion 
of government employees as potential qui tam relators in False Claims Act 
suits.”76 The 2009 FCA amendments did not change the qualifications for 
becoming a qui tam relator.77 Other portions of the 2009 FCA amendments 
expand the nature of claims that bring liability, including a negative or “re-
verse” fraud claim for contractors who seek to avoid making obligatory 
payments to the government rather than to obtain unearned payments from 
the government.78 
The qui tam provisions are intended to encourage private individuals to 
prosecute fraud on behalf of the government, but the government always 
retains the right to intervene in the suit.79 The Attorney General has discre-
tion to bring the action and to control the litigation from the outset.80 Even 
when the government does not intervene, the “litigation takes place in the 
shadow of the government’s prerogatives.”81 The government may also 
dismiss or settle the action over the objections of the relator,82 though the 
government rarely exercises its option to dismiss the case to the disad-
vantage of the relator.83 
B. Reward Scheme of Qui Tam Provisions 
The relator is entitled to an incentive scheme of payouts if the qui tam 
suit is successful, though the amount of the reward depends upon several 
                                                                                                                         
74 Id. 
75 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 
1995) (observing that allowing government employees to commence qui tam suits on 
frauds they learned of while on duty would create “perverse incentives”). Non-voluntary 
disclosures, such as those required by the terms of certain government employees’ duty to 
report fraud, will not suffice to establish the relator’s status as the original source of the 
information. Id. at 744. 
76 5B FED. PROC., L. ED. § 10:61 (2004). 
77 See DOYLE, QUI TAM, supra note 70, at 8. 
78 Id. at 14. 
79 Id. at 9. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B)). 
83 See Paula J. Zimmerman, Note, The Sequoia Significance: The Role of the Civil False 
Claims Act’s Dismissal Provision in Procurement Reform, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 329, 338 
(2000) (discussing the only case in which the DOJ has exercised the dismissal provision). 
604 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:591 
factors.84 A relator who pursues the litigation alone is entitled to between 
twenty-five and thirty percent of the proceeds of the suit or settlement.85 If 
the government chooses to intervene, the relator is entitled to between 
fifteen and twenty-five percent.86 If the relator’s contribution was mini-
mal—such as if the information provided was gleaned from easily acces-
sible sources or constituted only a small piece of the “puzzle”—his reward 
might be as low as ten percent.87 If the court finds that the relator partici-
pated in the fraud at issue, the court can decrease the reward.88 
C. Issues Resulting from Expansion Beyond Fraud Purposes of Qui Tam 
Provisions in False Claims Act 
At first glance, the FCA seems like an attractive option for increasing 
accountability over government contractors by bringing more crimes to 
light and by holding the contracting companies accountable for the crimes 
of their employees. At the most general level, the FCA is an investigative 
force multiplier, turning everyday citizens into investigators for the gov-
ernment.89 However, the potential efficacy and desirability of the FCA in 
this context are constrained in several important ways even when applied 
to instances of fraud, as initially was intended. 
The Informer’s Act of 1863,90 also known as the “Lincoln Law,”91 was 
enacted to incentivize civilians to root out Union suppliers’ corrupt and 
fraudulent practices.92 Or, as one sponsor of the Informer’s Act put it, the 
law’s purpose was “setting a rogue to catch a rogue.”93 Expanding the 
FCA to encourage reporting service contractors’ overseas crimes would 
not be just another application of economic incentives for civilians to 
                                                                                                                         
84 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012). 
85 § 3730(d)(2). 
86 § 3730(d)(1). 
87 § 3730(d)(1). 
88 § 3730(d)(3). 
89 See PAUL VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 178 (2007) (“By incentivizing 
private relators who retain a portion of the amounts recovered when the government has 
been defrauded, the government adds significantly to its contract monitoring resources at 
a time when contracting personnel are in short supply.” (footnote omitted)); West, supra 
note 50, at 35 (“Because of the complexity of these frauds and the insider knowledge 
necessary to understand them, the government would be at a loss to discover or piece 
together the schemes without the help of insiders.”). 
90 §§ 3729–33. 
91 West, supra note 50, at 35. 
92 See id. 
93 Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32. 
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reveal and explain to the government their co-workers’ accounting trick-
ery. Such an expansion would be more akin to a government scheme of-
fering rewards to encourage criminal witnesses to come forward, with the 
amount of the award varying according to the severity of the crime and the 
criminals’ employers paying for those rewards, but only if the prosecution 
is successful. To elaborate on this analogy, these results could all be ac-
complished without ever prosecuting the individual criminals, who would 
be tried in separate proceedings. Without Congress passing the CEJA94 the 
United States may not have the necessary criminal jurisdiction to follow 
up with those prosecutions, even if the crimes are known to the govern-
ment absent reporting by the public. 
While the FCA permits the government to hold accountable organiza-
tions that have defrauded the government, qui tam actions fail to hold 
criminally accountable the individual perpetrators of the fraud, as only the 
company is liable for damages.95 Fining government contracting firms for 
their employees’ individual overseas criminal actions makes little sense 
from a policy perspective, unless the relator can show some privity or 
knowledge by the contracting company. It would be absurd to fine em-
ployers because their employees committed crimes outside the scope of 
their duties here at home; it would be equally absurd to do so for crimes 
committed by employees outside of the United States. 
1. Perverse Incentives Created By Qui Tam Provisions 
Even “normal” qui tam actions for fraud are affected by perverse eco-
nomic incentives that influence a potential relator’s decision to bring the 
fraud to light, a lawyer’s decision to take or encourage the suit, and a con-
tracting company’s decision to maintain internal compliance systems. 
These incentives are all the more distasteful when considering the possi-
bility they affect the reporting of such misdeeds described above in Part 
I.B. that could otherwise be prosecuted under the MEJA or the CEJA. 
                                                                                                                         
94 See infra notes 169–84 and accompanying text (discussing CEJA and its benefits). 
The jurisdictional gap that currently allows contractors to escape punishment can be closed 
without changing the FCA and incurring its negative consequences. Infra notes 169–84. 
95 The FCA does contain criminal provisions for prosecuting individual defrauders, 
but those criminal sanctions are prosecuted by the government rather than civilian 
whistleblowers. See Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2007). In some cases the defrauder could be 
risking execution. Id. at 625-26, 625 n.4 (citing Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, 
Feared Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment’s Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 32 (2005)). 
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a. Perverse Incentives For Individual Relators 
The structure of the qui tam provisions incentivizes relators to wait for 
the fraud to accumulate until the potential reward outweighs the potential 
costs of coming forward, including the costs of litigation.96 A reward based 
upon the severity of the crime or fraud uncovered creates the temptation to 
allow the fraud to accumulate in order to earn a larger reward, resulting in 
the fraud continuing past the point at which it is socially optimal to inter-
vene—which most would agree is immediately upon discovering the 
crime or fraud.97 Additionally, “[t]he incentive to delay will be greatest 
where few people know of the misconduct, and thus the number of poten-
tial competing relators is small.”98 Security classifications would shield 
contractors’ actions from public view in some instances, constraining the 
universe of people who could discover the wrongdoing, and thereby en-
couraging potential relators to sit on the information until the most oppor-
tune moment. All of the security contractor misconduct examples dis-
cussed above involved a relatively small number of potential competing 
qui tam relators, especially the Passaro case.99 
b. Perverse Incentives For Relators’ Attorneys 
Incentive structures intended as enforcement systems, such as the qui 
tam provisions of the FCA, “can generate excessive litigation,”100 under-
mining efficiency gains from deputizing the public as fraud investigators. 
Relators’ attorneys suffer, and succumb to, the temptation of this system 
as much as any other party to qui tam actions: 
When private lawyers litigate on behalf of our government, shouldn’t 
the DOJ be expected to pay for the benefit? Defendants are never re-
quired to pay the tab of the public prosecutor, and to say that private 
lawyers are paid on a contingency basis does not make it free to the 
public, let alone to defendants.... Given the extraordinary protections 
built into the FCA, which prevent innocent defendants from holding 
                                                                                                                         
96 See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Providers 
in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1829 (1996); see also Ben 
Depoorter & Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An Economic Analysis of the False Claims 
Act, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 135, 136 (2006). 
97 See Depoorter & De Mot, supra note 96, at 136. 
98 See Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1829. 
99 See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
100 Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1825. 
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whistleblowers or their lawyers responsible for filing speculative com-
plaints, most simply settle.101 
Relators’ attorneys, fully aware of the government contractors’ tendency 
to settle, have no incentive to temper their clients’ enthusiasm for filing 
over-zealous complaints. 
c. Perverse Incentives For the Government Agencies Defrauded 
Even assuming that the fraud is reported, and that the DOJ intends to in-
tervene in the suit, a conflict of interest can exist for the agencies that have 
been defrauded.102 When making the decision to intervene in a qui tam 
action, the DOJ receives advice from the federal agency that was defraud-
ed.103 Those agencies might be less than enthusiastic about publicizing the 
fraud, particularly if the facts show that the agencies’ employees turned a 
blind eye to the issue.104 Approval, tacit or otherwise, by the federal agency 
is likely to be raised as a defense by contractors, as occurred in the prose-
cution of the Passaro case. 105 
2. Claims Can Result In Taxpayer-Funded Waste In and Of 
Themselves 
Pursuing a qui tam action after the DOJ has declined to intervene might 
amount to a waste of taxpayer funds itself, even absent greed on the part of 
the relator.106 A relator’s ability to bring a qui tam action can weaken the 
                                                                                                                         
101 Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32–33. 
102 See VERKUIL, supra note 89, at 179. 
103 See id.  
104 In the conversations surrounding the amendments to the qui tam provisions in the 
1980s, it was revealed that the DOJ dropped three prosecutions for fraud because “the 
procurement agencies had tacitly approved the contractors’ conduct and, as a result, 
prosecution was unwarranted.” Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32. See VERKUIL, supra 
note 89, at 179 (“The [defrauded] agencies’ judgment is a function both of [sic] the 
merits of the claims and the potential embarrassment public revelation might produce. In 
some circumstances, this may result in a conflict. The Department of the Interior’s 
decision to settle or not pursue claims against companies who have oil leases on 
government land, which are being maintained by private relators is an example in this 
regard.” (citing Edmund L. Andrews, Suits Say U.S. Impeded Audits for Oil Leases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at A1)). 
105 R. Jeffrey Smith, Interrogator Says U.S. Approved Handling of Detainee Who 
Died, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at A07; see also supra notes 41–44 and accompanying 
text (discussing United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207 (2009)). 
106 See Culbertson, supra note 50, at 32–33 (“Once the DOJ declines to intervene in qui 
tam cases, the role of private lawyers is fraught with conflicts and causes demonstrable 
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government’s bargaining power with the fraudulent contractor, making 
contractors less willing to negotiate and adopt mediating measures.107 Even 
if the contracting company were to comply with the proposed solutions or 
settlements for the challenged behavior that the DOJ might suggest, the 
government cannot always prevent a suit by a qui tam relator,108 which 
can be costly to contracting firms, even if the contracting companies go on 
to settle with the relator. An additional flaw of the qui tam provisions, 
which often leads to waste, is the lack of proper disincentives for filing 
frivolous qui tam actions.109 Therefore, as the number of suits filed in-
creases, “it is inevitable that there are more meritless suits among 
them.”110 As qui tam actions have skyrocketed,111 the lack of repercus-
sions for frivolous suits seems likely to create a vicious cycle in which the 
contracting companies are ever more likely to settle with frivolous relators 
as a cost of doing business. 
3. Effects of Qui Tam Provisions On Contractors’ Internal 
Management Actions 
Additionally, the possibility of qui tam suits distorts the business deci-
sion-making processes of the contracting firms themselves. The statutory 
scheme discourages contracting firms from creating an open atmosphere 
within their company for fear that employees might discover potential 
fraud and attempt to cash in through a qui tam suit. This could force a 
company to operate less efficiently by stifling internal communication.112 
The company might also over-invest in consensus, seeking to discourage 
                                                                                                                         
 
waste of taxpayer money and palpable abuse of innocent defendants.”); see also Kovacic, 
supra note 96, at 1829–30 (discussing a scenario in which the relator argued that he 
waited to file his action not out of greed but due to “his fear that the recipient of the bribe 
was prepared to have [him] killed”). 
107 Depoorter & De Mot, supra note 96, at 158. 
108 Under some circumstances, the government can dismiss a qui tam suit over the 
objections of the relator, though it rarely utilizes this option. See Zimmerman, supra note 
83, at 330 (“[As of 2000, the DOJ] has only dismissed one such case against the wishes 
of the relator.”). 
109 Id. at 330. 
110 Id. at 345. 
111 See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV., FRAUD STATISTICS-OTHER (NON-HHS, 
NON-DOD) 2 (2012), http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Stat 
istics.pdf (reporting that newly received referrals, investigations, and qui tam actions 
ballooned from 7 in 1987 to 178 in 2012). 
112 Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1834. 
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those on the losing end of internal decisions from initiating a lawsuit.113 
The temptation to bring qui tam actions also discourages employees who 
have uncovered fraud from using any internal reporting systems.114 Con-
tractors might also hesitate to discipline employees that might become 
litigious, or might terminate employees on overly generous terms in order 
to avoid qui tam suits.115 
4. Increased Litigation Costs To Contractors 
In addition to the impacts on internal decision-making, contracting 
firms must also prepare for the eventuality of becoming the subject of a 
baseless qui tam suit. Relators can be wrong, spiteful, or over-zealous in 
their pursuit of qui tam actions. Some relators might initiate litigation 
based on a mistaken understanding of the behavior, or might deliberately 
mischaracterize an innocuous situation in order to extract a settlement.116 
The qui tam scheme could also create a race to file suit. The scheme might 
prompt the government to litigate before its case is sufficiently prepared in 
order to keep a potential relator from participating—or interfering—in the 
litigation and ultimately sharing in the proceeds collected from the con-
tracting company, mimicking the race to court seen between relators.117  
Recent developments in the judicial interpretation of the qui tam pro-
visions also leave contracting companies in doubt of the relative strength 
of their case. In Little v. Shell Exploration & Production Co.,118 the Fifth 
Circuit recently held that qui tam actions can be brought by relators who 
uncover fraud in the course of their duties as government employees only 
so long as their reporting of the discovered fraud was “voluntary.”119 
However, the decision also leaves room for increased litigation from other 
government employees whose job description is less clear on the point of 
duty to disclose fraud than auditors such as those in Little.120 “[I]t suggests 
                                                                                                                         
113 See id. at 1827. 
114 See Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1830–31. Contracting companies are encouraged to 
establish internal compliance systems such as hotlines and internal audits. Id. at 1831. 
Their FCA fines might be reduced if they have these systems in place. Id. 
115 See id. at 1826–27. 
116 See id. at 1831–32. 
117 See id. at 1839. 
118 690 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2012). 
119 See id. at 294 (“[T]he fact that a relator ‘was employed specifically to disclose 
fraud is sufficient to render his disclosures nonvoluntary.’” (quoting United States ex rel. 
Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc))). 
120 Roderick L. Thomas et al., Little v. Shell—Bad News for Government Contractors, 
GOV’T CONT. L. 360 (Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.wileyrein.com/publication 
s.cfm?sp=articles&id=8251. 
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that contract administrators and other government employees can bring 
whistleblower actions even if their agency superiors do not find the al-
leged misconduct worthy of further investigation,” which leaves open the 
potential for an increase in the number of actions by disgruntled govern-
ment employees.121 The Little decision falls in accord with other, similarly 
expansive decisions from the First and Ninth Circuits.122 
To illustrate the scope of qui tam actions, in fiscal year 2012 alone there 
were 178 new qui tam matters in which the defrauded agency was neither 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) nor DoD.123 For DoD 
alone, in 2012 there were 57 qui tam matters.124 In 1987 there were no qui 
tam actions for either DoD or HHS in which the government intervened.125 
These increased costs of operation in the government contracting mar-
ket—especially as compared to the relatively less risky opportunities 
available in the private market for like services—create a disincentive for 
firms to enter the market, and thus to compete for government contracts.126 
Firms whose current business portfolio involves a mix of private- and 
public-sector opportunities might be tempted to leave the market or re-
balance their portfolio in favor of private sector opportunities.127 As in any 
market, decreased competition generally “creat[es] the potential for a 
costlier, lower-quality product.”128 One need only imagine the dire results 
of employing a “lower quality” security contractor in the chaotic or high-
stress situations that arise in the course of security contractors’ duties 
overseas to see that this effect is undesirable. 
III. CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ALREADY IN FORCE 
A. Market Preferences for “Good” Companies 
Several accountability mechanisms already exist to encourage gov-
ernment contracting firms to act legally and in accordance with public 
                                                                                                                         
121 Id. 
122 See United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 
1995); United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 
123 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV., FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 111. “Matters” 
include newly received referrals, investigations, and qui tam actions. Id. at 2. 
124 Id. at 6. By comparison, there were only twelve non-qui tam actions in 2012. Id. 
125 Id. at 5. 
126 Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1839–40 (“For firms that previously have not done 
business with federal agencies, the existence of such costs can discourage entry into 
government procurement markets.”). 
127 Kovacic, supra note 96, at 1840. 
128 Id. 
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norms. Contracting companies that provide military or security services 
to the government, like any other business, stand to suffer or benefit 
from their public reputation.129 The interest in maintaining a good public 
reputation presumably dissuades contractors from violations of the same 
criminal laws enforced “at home.” For example, there was a 2010 movie 
loosely based on the DynCorp Bosnian sex-trafficking scandal.130 The movie, 
entitled The Whistleblower,131 and a non-fiction book with the same title co-
authored by one of the women who brought the DynCorp scandal to light,132 
elicited a public statement from DynCorp International.133 In the statement, 
the company attempted to distance itself from the decade-old scandal and to 
highlight the procedures it had since put in place to prevent such behavior in 
the future.134 The company’s reputation was seriously tarnished by the actions 
of its employees, and its name became synonymous with contractor scandal 
long before Blackwater achieved its present level of notoriety.135 Blackwater 
                                                                                                                         
129 See P. W. Singer, CORPORATE WARRIORS 217 (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 2003) (“By 
privatizing military services, certain motivations for good behavior appear to be 
increased. In specific, military firms do not simply kill for no good reason. Thus, blanket 
accusations of the industry as a whole as being an enterprise of evil, violent greed, 
generally ring false on deeper examination. Rather, [private military firms] are businesses 
with certain goals. Military provider firms do use violence, but their general goal is not 
violence for its own sake, but rather to achieve the task for which they were hired. 
Considering the increasingly messy wars of the twenty-first century, the firms’ personnel 
also operate with far greater military professionalism than most actors in local conflicts.”). 
Note that the author is comparing private military firms with local actors worldwide, 
including local militias in sub-Saharan Africa, not necessarily American or coalition troops 
in the recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But see id. at 218 (“[C]orporate 
responsibility and a nice public image have their limits. As profit-driven actors, they will 
make operational decisions also influenced by their bottom lines. So, although it is wrong to 
assume that military provider firms just kill for money, there may be some situations where 
transgressing human rights may be in their corporate interests.”). 
130 Isenberg, Déjà Vu, supra note 25. 
131 THE WHISTLEBLOWER (Samuel Goldwyn Films 2010). 
132 KATHRYN BOLKOVAC & CARI LYNN, THE WHISTLEBOWER: SEX TRAFFICKING, 
MILITARY CONTRACTORS, AND ONE WOMAN’S FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2011).  
133 Press Release, DynCorp International, DynCorp International Statement on “The 
Whistleblower” (on file with author).  
134 Id. 
135 See Isenberg, Déjà Vu, supra note 25. To illustrate the extent to which DynCorp 
was marred by this incident, “[t]he negative impact of just those two cases cannot be 
overstated. Indeed, search online for ‘dyncorp AND sex scandal’ as I just did and you get 
nearly nine thousand hits. DynCorp spent many years trying to move past the bad 
publicity resulting from these cases.” Id. 
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also tried to distance itself from its own scandal, rebranding itself as Xe.136 
When that did not work—Xe lost a State Department contract despite the new 
name—the name was changed again to Academi.137 
B. Local Nations’ Laws 
Although contractors are currently protected from prosecution under lo-
cal laws in Iraq and Afghanistan, one accountability solution would be to 
expose them to criminal or civil liability under local laws.138 In the wake of 
the Nisour Square incident, one response to the contractor accountability 
gap was a call to waive the immunity that had been negotiated with the Iraqi 
government.139 “One remedy is not being discussed: the State Department 
can waive immunity for contractors and let the case be tried in the Iraqi 
courts under Order 17, which is the section of the Transitional Administra-
tive Law approved in 2004 that gives contractors immunity.”140 
C. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
There have been a handful of successful criminal prosecutions of con-
tractors under the MEJA.141 The DOJ announced in January 2012 that 
Keith Strimple pleaded guilty under the MEJA to multiple child exploita-
tion charges.142 When these crimes were committed in 2007, Strimple was 
employed by a government contractor as a plumber at Camp Fallujah in 
                                                                                                                         
136 Blackwater Name Change: Private Security Firm Switches Name Again to Academi 
From Xe, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 15, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 
11/12/12/blackwater-name-change-private-security-firm-academi_n_1143789.html. 
137 Id. 
138 In Afghanistan, the legal status of contractors was “ambiguously” addressed in 
diplomatic notes. David Isenberg, Dogs of War, U.P.I. (Jan. 12, 2009, 10:33 AM), http:// 
www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2009/01/12/Dogs-of-War-The-future-of-contractor-acc 
ountability-immunity-or-impunity/UPI-88801231774390/tab-photos/. In Iraq, the order 
granting immunity from the local justice system was negotiated such that in exchange for 
not trying contractors in local courts contractors would be subject to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice. See Alissa J. Rubin & Paul von Zielbauer, The Judgment Gap in a Case 
Like the Blackwater Shootings, There Are Many Laws But More Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 11, 2007, at A1; infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text (discussing the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice). 
139 See Rubin & von Zielbauer, supra note 138. 
140 Id. 
141 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–67 (2000). 
142 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Employee of Government Contractor 
Pleads Guilty in Oklahoma to Child Pornography Charge (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http: 
//www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/January/12-crm-007.html. 
2014] OVERSEAS CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY 613 
Iraq for approximately five months.143 Mr. Strimple admitted that during that 
time, “he searched for and downloaded videos of minors that he believed to 
be as young as 12 years old engaging in sexually explicit conduct and down-
loaded such images using the contractor’s computer system.”144 Incidentally, 
even without financial incentives such as the qui tam provisions, Mr. Strimple 
was caught as a result of information provided by an anonymous tipster.145 
Another successful use of the MEJA146 is illustrated in United States v. 
Arnt.147 In this case, the defendant, Mrs. LaTasha Arnt, fatally stabbed her 
husband, a staff sergeant assigned to a military base in Turkey.148 Though 
this case had a complicated history, the government was ultimately able to 
show that Mrs. Arnt was “accompanying” the armed forces as a military 
dependent.149 This case did not involve a contractor, but it highlights an-
other potential gap in accountability: that of families accompanying con-
tractors to posts overseas. While families are not likely to accompany 
contractors to a combat zone, there is greater potential for this situation at 
other locations overseas where non-DoD agencies and their employees 
operate. These successful prosecutions are not only a testament to the 
potential of a civilian corollary to the MEJA, but also to the flexibility 
required of such a corollary due to the changing structure and mission of 
the government’s employees overseas. 
Despite these successes, accountability gaps remain. In a hearing on 
the CEJA, Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division of the 
DOJ, Lanny Breuer, described some of those gaps: 
The unfortunate consequence of the current state of the law is that, for 
example, a Department of Defense contractor who murders a colleague 
in Iraq may be prosecuted under MEJA, while a contractor with another 
U.S. agency who commits the very same crime may not be, since he or 
she may not be covered by MEJA. Similarly, an employee with a non-
Department of Defense agency who rapes a foreign national in the em-
ployee’s diplomatic residence may be prosecuted for committing a 
                                                                                                                         
143 David Harper, Tulsan Who Worked in Iraq Sentenced in Child Porn Case, 
TULSA WORLD (Apr. 12, 2012, 2:40 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/tuls 
an-who-worked-in-iraq-sentenced-in-child-porn-case/article_8f8fe907-d18c-5df7-b42 
7-4fec05d4e93a.html; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 142. 
144 Id. 
145 Harper, supra note 143. 
146 Note that this outcome would not be possible under the proposal to alter the qui 
tam provisions, making a civilian corollary to the MEJA preferable. 
147 474 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2007). 
148 Id. at 1161. 
149 See id. at 1162–63. 
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crime within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States, while the same person might not be able to be prosecuted 
if he commits the same crime in the victim’s apartment.150 
These hypothetical gaps are not unreasonable or far-fetched. 
The government’s successful prosecution of Mr. David Passaro,151 a 
contractor supporting the CIA in Afghanistan,152 illustrates the continued 
challenges of conducting criminal prosecution under the MEJA’s jurisdic-
tion.153 Though Mr. Passaro was ultimately successfully convicted, he was 
convicted under the USA PATRIOT Act,154 not the MEJA, due to the 
MEJA’s limited application only to contractors supporting the DoD.155 
The Blackwater security guards implicated in the Nisour Square 
shooting in Iraq were contractors employed by the Department of State, 
whose contract stated their mission was diplomatic rather than support-
ing the DoD.156 Thus, because the case was dismissed on other grounds, 
                                                                                                                         
150 Holding Criminals Accountable: Extending Criminal Jurisdiction For Government 
Contractors And Employees Abroad: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. Criminal 
Div., Dep’t of Justice). 
151 United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 956 
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152 See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
153 Associated Press, CIA Contractor Is Charged Under the Patriot Act, U.S.A. 
TODAY (June 18, 2004, 5:05 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-06-
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2000, allows for the prosecution in U.S. federal courts of civilians hired by the Defense 
Department, relatives of U.S military members, and a few other types of people who 
accompany military personnel in foreign countries. But the law is written in such a way 
that CIA contractors are not subject to it.”). 
154 Passaro, 577 F.3d at 212, 216. 
155 See Holding Criminals Accountable, supra note 150, at 2 (statement of Lanny A. 
Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice). Similarly, another CIA 
contractor was convicted within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States for “abusive sexual contact” committed while he was stationed in Algiers. 
Id. at 5 (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. Criminal Div., Dep’t of 
Justice) (discussing United States v. Warren, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010)). 
156 Their case was ultimately dismissed in United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 
112 (D.D.C. 2009). However, the dismissal means that “the jurisdiction of MEJA for 
contractors working for a department other than Defense is uncertain. The decision by 
Judge Urbina meant that the defendants’ argument that MEJA didn’t apply to them as 
contractors working for the State Department in support of its mission never reached 
trial.” David Isenberg, Contractors and the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2010, 2:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenbe 
rg/contractors-and-the-civil_b_446298.html [hereinafter Isenberg, Contractors]. 
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the question remains as to whether these contractors could have been 
held accountable under the MEJA.157 
D. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was amended at the 
end of 2006 under legislation proposed by Senator Lindsey Graham,158 a 
South Carolina Republican who is also in the Judge Advocate General 
Corps of the United States Air Force Reserve,159 to hold accountable con-
tractors “in declared wars or contingency operations.”160 However, dis-
putes have arisen regarding whether this formulation would include State 
Department contractors like Blackwater who provide security services for 
a civilian agency like the Department of State.161 Therefore, under either 
the MEJA or the UCMJ, prosecutorial doubt remains as to the effect of the 
contractors’ status supporting an agency other than the DoD.162 
IV. THE CIVILIAN EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ACT AND SIMILAR 
LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS 
A. Predecessors to the CEJA 
Representative David Price, a Democrat from North Carolina, the spon-
sor of both the 2010 and the 2011 CEJA bills in the House,163 has been 
working to find a solution for the accountability gap since long before in-
troducing the CEJA of 2010.164 In October 2007, Rep. Price introduced 
legislation to amend the MEJA to cover all contractors working for the 
U.S. government in war zones.165 
                                                                                                                         





162 Id. (“As recently as Oct. 3, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates indicated that no 
decision had been made on how to apply the new language. In other statements, Pentagon 
officials have suggested that they would apply the military code to Defense Department 
contractors. That could leave contractors working for other agencies, such as Blackwater, 
outside military law.”). 
163 H.R. 4567, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010); H.R. 2136, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
164 Isenberg, Contractors, supra note 156. 
165 Id. 
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Remarking on the difficulty of trying the Blackwater contractors for 
the Nisour Square shootings under either the MEJA or the UCMJ, one 
journalist noted: 
One irony is that back in October 2007 the House approved a bill intro-
duced by Congressman Price which would ensure that the U.S. govern-
ment has the legal authority to prosecute crimes committed by U.S. con-
tractor personnel working in war zones. Defense Department contractors 
were already covered under U.S. law, but contractors who worked for the 
State Department and other agencies, were not liable for criminal activity 
under current law. Price’s bill extended the jurisdiction of MEJA to cover 
all contractors working for the government in a war zone.166 
However, even the 2007 version of the bill introduced by Rep. Price 
would have left open the legal question of the MEJA’s application to con-
tractors employed by other government agencies operating in areas other 
than war zones. 
B. The 2010 and 2011 CEJA Proposals 
Rep. Price and Sen. Leahy introduced versions of the CEJA in both 
2010 and 2011.167 The 2011 version is quite similar to the one introduced 
in 2010, though it addresses some concerns that were raised regarding the 
2010 version of the bill.168 
1. The CEJA Benefits To the Public 
The CEJA of 2011 directs the DOJ to increase the number of investi-
gators dedicated to contractor criminal allegations,169 which would seem to 
be redundant of the force multiplier effect of an FCA extension. However, 
in many of the instances cited as failures of contractor accountability, there 
is not much need for an investigative “force multiplier” that includes every-
day citizens, as the number of U.S. citizens privy to useful information is 
necessarily low. In the Nisour Square incident, for example, the Department 
of State contractors who fired into a crowd were surrounded by witnesses, 
                                                                                                                         
166 Id. 
167 S. 2979, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010); H.R. 4567, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010); 
H.R. 2136, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); S. 1145, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
168 Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., R42358, Civilian Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act: Federal Contractor Criminal Liability Overseas 1 (Feb. 2012) 
[hereinafter Doyle, CEJA]. 
169 Isenberg, Contractors, supra note 156. 
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but most of them were Iraqi citizens and therefore would not have been 
able to bring qui tam actions.170 In that type of situation, there is already a 
limited number of potential relators, regardless of the potential financial 
reward. No amount of potential qui tam reward could multiply the investi-
gative force in that instance. 
The CEJA in its 2011 form would also allow the Attorney General to 
authorize federal agents to arrest contractors who are suspected of having 
committed crimes while they are still overseas.171 The Attorney General 
would also be required to report to Congress annually on the number of 
offenses prosecuted under the CEJA.172 Among other topics to be ad-
dressed, the annual report would recommend changes to make the CEJA 
more effective,173 which would allow the law to be more responsive as the 
use of contractors overseas continues to evolve. 
The CEJA of 2011174 would also give the government many proce-
dural advantages. If the defendant is located overseas at the time the 
government is prepared to bring its case, the government is permitted to 
pick the district in which to bring its case.175 If the defendant has already 
returned to the United States when the government is prepared to make 
an arrest or seek an indictment, the government has slightly less freedom 
in choosing a venue.176 However, both the Senate and House versions 
would still provide the government some additional flexibility.177 The 
government could choose to pursue the case in the district in which “the 
employing or contracting agency maintains its headquarters.”178 This 
prosecutorial flexibility for the government might inconvenience some 
defendants who do not reside in the district the government chooses, but 
such an inconvenience in itself might be a valuable bargaining chip for the 
government to encourage plea agreements.179 
                                                                                                                         
170 See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text. 
171 Isenberg, Contractors, supra note 156. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 H.R. 2136, 112th Cong. (2011); see also S. 1145 112th Cong. (2011). The House 
version of the bill was introduced by Rep. David Price, and the Senate version was 
introduced by Sen. Patrick Leahy. The two versions are nearly identical. 
175 Doyle, CEJA, supra note 168, at 11 (citing H.R. 2136, § 4(a), proposed 18 § U.S.C. 
3245; S. 1145, § 2(b), proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3245). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. The Senate bill would also provide this flexibility in choice of venue for 
prosecutions under the MEJA. Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. Though the defendant might be inconvenienced, other parties, such as 
witnesses from the defendant’s employer or the contracting government agency—and 
thus the public as bill-payers—will be better served. 
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Under the CEJA of 2011, prosecutions would no longer become bogged 
down in the jurisdictional issues that currently hamper prosecutions under 
the MEJA.180 Without a civilian complement to the MEJA, “[c]ases that 
would otherwise be straightforward can turn into complex investiga-
tions.”181 The cases can be stalled while investigating the criminal conduct 
in question, the specific terms of the defendant’s employment and duties 
under the contract, and other facts to determine the exact nature of the de-
fendant’s employment.182 These complex, fact-specific investigations can 
become even more complicated when they need to be conducted in a com-
bat zone or other remote location.183 Occasionally, the investigations are 
further complicated by security classification issues.184 These complica-
tions could be avoided entirely if the CEJA or another civilian comple-
ment to the MEJA is passed. 
2. The CEJA Benefits to Defendants 
If passed, the CEJA may also be considered protective of individual 
contractors. Rather than imposing an additional burden on contractors, the 
CEJA could be part of a local agreement on contractors’ legal status. Con-
sidering some of the alternatives, such as prosecution under local laws, 
Americans implicated in criminal prosecutions may prefer that their pro-
ceedings be handled by the more familiar American justice system. 
A civilian corollary to the MEJA, such as the CEJA bills introduced by 
Rep. Price in 2010 and 2011, would, at the most basic level, extend federal 
criminal jurisdiction to wherever government contractors operate.185 As 
such, there is not much of a learning curve for companies or their employ-
ees required; acts that would constitute federal crimes at “home” are most 
likely also federal crimes when committed abroad. Consider the successful 
use of the MEJA to prosecute incidents of child pornography as discussed 
                                                                                                                         
180 See Holding Criminals Accountable, supra note 150, at 4–5 (statement of Lanny 
A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice). 
181 Id. at 4. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. (“Although the Justice Department may use procedures set out under the 
Classified Information Procedures Act, such procedures may not be adequate to protect 
national security information and also establish to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
defendant is subject to MEJA.”). 
185 See Doyle, CEJA, supra note 168, at 7 (“The list [of covered offenses] includes drug 
trafficking, terrorism offenses, assault, murder, and most of the other common law offenses 
that would be subject to federal prosecution had they occurred within the United States ....”). 
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above, for example.186 These types of crimes are not the most obvious 
when one mentions crimes committed by contractors overseas, yet the 
illegality of those acts and criminal liability of those involved should be 
utterly clear to any contractor, contracting company, or, especially, legal 
counsel examining their potential liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed expansion of the qui tam provisions of the FCA to re-
ward relators who report instances of contractor crimes would be ineffec-
tive. Such a change would actually exacerbate the existing issues and 
incentives with the qui tam scheme and might create a few more by caus-
ing changes to the internal operations of contracting companies. The same 
end result—increased contractor accountability—could be achieved by 
passing some version of the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act as a 
complement to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which is a 
proven criminal law scheme. 
The successful convictions under the MEJA discussed above extend 
far beyond the types of crimes typically associated in the headlines with 
contractors overseas. This potential to adapt to new types of crimes and 
new uses of contractors makes passing a law along the lines of the CEJA 
preferable over changes to the qui tam provisions. Passing a version of the 
CEJA would also ward off the perverse economic incentives inherent in 
the qui tam provisions of the FCA. With any luck, Congress will be proac-
tive and pass a civilian corollary to the MEJA now—in the relative calm 
of large military drawdowns—rather than wait for some future scandal 
before summoning the will to act. 
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